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Abstract
For arbitrary cycle-free directed graph games tree-type values are introduced
axiomatically and their explicit formula representation is provided. These val-
ues may be considered as natural extensions of the tree and sink values as has
been defined correspondingly for rooted and sink forest graph games. The main
property for the tree value is that every player in the game receives the worth
of this player together with his successors minus what these successors receive.
It implies that every coalition of players consisting of one of the players with
all his successors receives precisely its worth. Additionally their efficiency and
stability are studied. Simple recursive algorithms to calculate the values are
also provided. The application to the water distribution problem of a river with
multiple sources, a delta and possibly islands is considered.
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1 Introduction
In standard cooperative game theory it is assumed that any coalition of players may
form. However, in many practical situations the collection of coalitions that can
be formed is restricted by some social, economical, hierarchical, communication,
or technical structure. The study of games with transferable utility and limited
cooperation introduced by means of communication graphs was initiated by Myerson
[7]. In this paper we restrict our consideration to the class of cycle-free digraph
games in which the players are partially ordered and the communication via bilateral
agreements between players is represented by a directed graph without directed
cycles. A cycle-free digraph cooperation structure allows modeling of various flow
situations when several links may merge at a node, while other links split at a node
into several separate ones.
It is assumed that a directed link represents a one-way communication situation.
This restricts the set of coalitions that can be formed. In the paper we consider two
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different scenarios possible for controlling cooperation in case of directed communi-
cation. First it is assumed that players can only control their successors and if in
the underlying graph structure a player is a successor of another player and both
players are members of some coalition, then also within this coalition the former
player must be a successor of the last player. Another scenario assumes that players
can only control their predecessors and nobody accepts that one of his predecessors
becomes his equal partner if a coalition forms.
We introduce tree-types values for cycle-free digraph games axiomatically and
provide their explicit formula representation. On the class of cycle-free digraph
games the (root-)tree value is completely characterized by maximal-tree efficiency
(MTE) and successor equivalence (SE), where a value is maximal-tree efficient if for
every root of the graph, being a player without predecessors, it holds that the payoff
for him and his successors is equal to the worth they can get by their own, and a
value is successor equivalent if when a link towards a player is deleted this player and
all his successors will get the same payoff. It implies that every player receives what
he contributes when he joins his successors in the graph and that the total payoff
for any player together with all his successors is equal to the worth they can get by
their own. Similarly, we introduce the sink-tree value which on the class of cycle-
free digraph games is completely characterized by maximal-sink efficiency (MSE)
and predecessor equivalence (PE). At the sink value every player receives what he
contributes when he joins his predecessors in the graph and the total payoff for this
player and all his predecessors is equal their worth. It is worth to emphasize that
both values should not be considered as personal payment by one player to another
one (the boss to his subordinate) but as distribution of the total worth according to
the proposed scheme. We also provide simple recursive computational methods for
computing these values and study their efficiency and when possible their stability.
The introduced tree and sink values for arbitrary cycle-free digraph games may be
considered as natural extensions of the tree and sink values defined correspondingly
for rooted and sink forest digraph games (cf. Demange [3], Khmelnitskaya [6]).
Furthermore, we extend the Ambec and Sprumont [1] line-graph river game model
of sharing a river to the case of a river with multiple sources, a delta and possibly
islands by applying the results obtained to this more general problem of sharing a
river among different agents located at different levels along the river bed restated
in terms of a cycle-free digraph game.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Basic definitions and notation are intro-
duced in Sect. 2. Sect. 3 provides an axiomatic characterization of the tree value for
a rooted-tree digraph game via component efficiency and subordinate equivalence.
In Sect. 4 we discuss application to the water distribution problem of a river with
multiple sources, a delta and possibly islands.
2 Preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game) is a pair 〈N, v〉, where N =
{1, . . . , n} is a finite set of n, n ≥ 2, players and v : 2N → IR is a characteristic
function, defined on the power set ofN , satisfying v(∅) = 0. A subset S ⊆ N is called
a coalition and the associated real number v(S) represents the worth of coalition
S. The set of TU games with fixed player set N we denote GN . For simplicity of
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notation and if no ambiguity appears, we write v instead of 〈N, v〉 when we refer to a
TU game. A game v ∈ G is superadditive if v(S∪T ) ≥ v(S)+v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N ,
such that S ∩ T = ∅, and v ∈ G is convex if v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ),
for all S, T ⊆ N . A value on a subset G of GN is a function ξ : G → IR
N that
assigns to every game v ∈ G a vector ξ(v) ∈ IRN ; the number ξi(v) represents the
payoff to player i, i ∈ N , in the game v. In the sequel we use standard notation
x(S)=
∑
i∈S xi, xS=(xi)i∈S for any x∈ IR
N and S ⊆ N , |A| for the cardinality of a
given set A, and omit brackets when writing one-player coalitions such as i instead
of {i}, i ∈ N .
A payoff vector x ∈ IRN in a game v ∈ G is efficient if it holds that x(N) = v(N).
We also say that a coalition S ⊆ N is efficient in a game v ∈ G with respect to a
payoff vector x ∈ IRN if x(S) = v(S).
The core [4] of a game v ∈ GN is defined as
C(v) = {x ∈ IRN | x(N) = v(N), x(S) ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N}.
For a game v ∈ GN , together with the core, we may consider the weak core defined
as
C˜(v) = {x ∈ IRN | x(N) ≤ v(N), x(S) ≥ v(S), for all S $ N}.
A value ξ on a subset G of GN is stable if for any game v ∈ G it holds that ξ(v) ∈ C(v),
and a value ξ on G is weakly stable if for any game v ∈ G it holds that ξ(v) ∈ C˜(v).
The cooperation structure on the player set N is specified by a graph, directed
or undirected, on N . An undirected graph on N consists of a set of nodes, being the
elements of N , and a collection of unordered pairs of nodes Γ ⊆ Γ cN = { {i, j} | i, j ∈
N, i 6= j}, where Γ cN is the complete undirected graph without loops on N and an
unordered pair {i, j} ∈ Γ is a link between i, j ∈ N . A directed graph, or digraph,
on N is given by a collection of directed links Γ ⊆ Γ¯ cN = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}. A
subset Γ ′ of a graph Γ on N is a subgraph of Γ . For a subgraph Γ ′ of Γ , S(Γ ′) ⊆ N
is the set of nodes in Γ ′, i.e., S(Γ ′) = {i ∈ N | ∃j ∈ N : {i, j} ∈ Γ ′}, if Γ is
undirected, and S(Γ ′) = {i ∈ N | ∃j ∈ N : {(i, j), (j, i)}∩Γ ′ 6= ∅}, if Γ is a digraph.
For a graph Γ on N and a coalition S ⊆ N , the subgraph of Γ on S is the graph
Γ |S = {{i, j}∈Γ | i, j∈S}, if Γ is undirected, and Γ |S = {(i, j)∈Γ | i, j∈S}, if Γ
is directed.
In a graph Γ on N a sequence of different nodes p = (i1, . . . , ir) is a path in Γ
from node i1 to node ir if r ≥ 2 and for h=1, . . . , r−1 it holds that {ih, ih+1}∈Γ
when Γ is undirected and {(ih, ih+1), (ih+1, ih)} ∩ Γ 6= ∅ when Γ is directed. In a
digraph Γ on N a path ~p = (i1, . . . , ir) is a directed path from node i1 to node ir if
for all h=1, . . . , r−1 it holds that (ih, ih+1) ∈ Γ . For a digraph Γ on N and any
i, j∈N we denote by ~PΓ (i, j) the set of all directed paths from i to j in Γ . Any node
i of a (directed) path p we denote as an element of p, i.e., i ∈ p. Moreover, when
for a directed path ~p in a digraph Γ we write (i, j) ∈ ~p, we assume that i and j are
consecutive nodes in ~p. For any set P of (directed) paths, by S(P ) = {i ∈ p | p ∈ P}
we denote the set of nodes determining the paths in P . A directed link (i, j) ∈ Γ
for which there exists a directed path ~p in Γ from i to j such that ~p 6= (i, j) is
inessential, otherwise (i, j) is an essential link. A directed path ~p is a proper path
if it contains only essential links.
In a graph Γ on N , undirected or directed, a sequence of nodes (i1, . . . , ir+1) is
a cycle if r ≥ 3, (i1, . . . , ir) and (i2, . . . , ir+1) are paths and i1 = ir+1. In a digraph
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Γ a sequence of nodes (i1, . . . , ir+1) is a directed cycle if r ≥ 2, (i1, . . . , ir) and
(i2, . . . , ir+1) are directed paths, and i1 = ir+1. An undirected graph Γ is cycle-free
if it contains no cycles. A digraph Γ on N is cycle-free if it contains no directed
cycles, i.e., no node is a successor of itself. A digraph Γ on N is strongly cycle-free if
it is cycle-free and contains no cycles. Remark that in a strongly cycle-free digraph
all links are essential.
For a directed link (i, j) ∈ Γ , i is the origin and j is the terminus, i is a superior
of j and j is a subordinate or follower of i. If a directed link (i, j) is essential, then
j is a proper subordinate of i and i is a proper superior of j. All nodes having the
same superior in Γ are called brothers. Besides, for i, j ∈ N , j is a (proper) successor
of i and i is a (proper) predecessor of j if there is a directed (proper) path from i to
j. For i ∈ N , we denote by PΓ (i) the set of all predecessors of i in Γ , by OΓ (i) the
set of all superiors of i in Γ , by O∗
Γ
(i) the set of all proper superiors of i, by FΓ (i)
the set of all subordinates of i in Γ , by F ∗
Γ
(i) the set of all proper subordinates of
i, by SΓ (i) the set of all successors of i in Γ , and by BΓ (i) the set of all brothers
of i in Γ . Moreover, for i ∈ N , we define P¯Γ (i) = PΓ (i) ∪ i, S¯Γ (i) = SΓ (i) ∪ i, and
B¯Γ (i) = BΓ (i) ∪ i. A coalition S ⊆ N is a full successors set in Γ , if S = S¯Γ (i)
for some i ∈ N , and is a full predecessors set in Γ , if S = P¯Γ (i) for some i ∈ N .
A node i ∈ N having no superior in Γ , i.e., OΓ (i) = ∅, is a root in Γ . A node
i ∈ N having no subordinate in Γ , i.e., FΓ (i) = ∅, is a leaf in Γ . For any S ⊆ N
denote by RΓ (S) the set of all roots in Γ |S and by LΓ (S) the set of all leaves in
Γ |S . For simplicity of notation, for a digraph Γ on N and i ∈ N , by Γ
i we denote
the subgraph Γ |S¯Γ (i) and by Γi the subgraph Γ |P¯Γ (i). Given a digraph Γ on N and
i ∈ N , the in-degree of i is defined as dΓ (i) = |O
∗
Γ
(i)| and the out-degree of i as
d˜Γ (i) = |F
∗
Γ
(i)|, while for any i ∈ N and j ∈ SΓ (i) the in-degree of j with respect to
i is equal to d i(j) = |O∗
Γ i
(j)| and for any j ∈ PΓ (i) the out-degree of j with respect
to i is equal to di(j) = |F
∗
Γi
(j)|. Given a digraph Γ on N , i ∈ N and j ∈ PΓ (i), a
node h ∈ S(~PΓ (i, j)) such that d
i(h) · dj(h) > 1 is called a proper intersection point
in S(~PΓ (i, j)).
Given a graph Γ on N , two nodes i and j in N are connected if there exists a
path from node i to node j. Graph Γ on N is connected if any two nodes in N are
connected. Given a graph Γ on N , a coalition S ⊆ N is connected if the subgraph
Γ |S is connected. For a graph Γ on N and coalition S ⊆ N , C
Γ (S) is the set of all
connected subcoalitions of S, S/Γ is the set of maximally connected subcoalitions of
S, called the components of S, and (S/Γ )i is the component of S containing player
i ∈ S.
A directed graph Γ on N is a (rooted) tree if it has precisely one root, denoted
r(Γ ), and there is a unique directed path in Γ from this node to any other node in
N . In a tree the root plays the role of the source of the stream presented via this
graph. A directed graph Γ on N is a sink tree if the directed graph composed by
the same set of links as Γ but with the opposite orientation is a rooted tree; in this
case a root of a tree changes its meaning to an absorbing sink. A directed graph Γ is
a (rooted/sink) forest if it is composed by a number of disjoint (rooted/sink) trees.
A line-graph is a forest that contains links only between subsequent nodes. Both a
rooted tree and a sink tree, and in particular a line-graph, are strongly cycle-free.
For a directed graph Γ , a subgraph T is a subtree of Γ if T is a tree on S(T ). A
subtree T of a digraph Γ is a full subtree if it contains together with its root r(T )
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all successors of r(T ), in other words, S(T ) = S¯Γ (r(T )). A full subtree T of Γ is a
maximal subtree if its root is a root of Γ .
In what follows it is assumed that the cooperation structure on the player setN is
specified by a cycle-free directed graph, not necessarily being strongly cycle-free. A
pair 〈v,Γ 〉 of a game v ∈ GN and a cycle-free directed communication graph Γ on N
constitutes a game with cycle-free limited cooperation or cycle-free digraph structure
and is also called a directed cycle-free graph game or just a cycle-free digraph game.
The set of all cycle-free digraph games on a fixed player set N is denoted GΓN . A
value on a subset G of GΓN is a function ξ : G → IR
N that assigns to every cycle-free
digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ G a vector of payoffs ξ(v,Γ ) ∈ IRN . For any graph game
〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN , a payoff vector x ∈ IR
N is component efficient if for every component
C ∈ N/Γ it holds that x(C) = v(C).
3 Main results
In this section we introduce two values for the class of cycle-free digraph games, not
being necessarily strongly cycle-free.
For a directed link in an arbitrary digraph there are two different interpretations
possible. One interpretation is that a link is directed to indicate which player has
initiated the communication, but at the same time it represents a fully developed
communication link. In such a case, following Myerson [7], it is assumed that coop-
eration is possible among any set of connected players, i.e., the coalitions in which
players are able to cooperate, the productive coalitions, are all the connected coali-
tions. In this case the focus is on component efficient values. Another interpretation
of a directed link assumes that a directed link represents the only one-way commu-
nication situation. In that case not every connected coalition might be productive.
In this paper we abide by the second interpretation of a directed link and consider
two different options for creation of the productive coalitions.
3.1 Tree connectedness
In a cycle-free digraph Γ there is at least one node having no superior. A node
without superior, i.e., any root in the graph, can be seen as a topman of the commu-
nication structure given by Γ . There are different scenarios possible for controlling
cooperation in case of directed communication. First we assume that in any coalition
each player can be controlled only by his predecessors and that nobody accepts that
one of his subordinates becomes his equal partner if a coalition forms. This entails
the assumption that the only productive coalitions are the so-called tree connected,
or simply t-connected, coalitions, being the connected coalitions S ∈ CΓ (N) that
also meet the condition that for every root i∈RΓ (S) it holds that i /∈SΓ (j) for any
other root j ∈RΓ (S). It is not difficult to see that the latter condition guarantees
that every t-connected coalition inherits the subordination of players prescribed by
Γ in N . Obviously, every component C ∈ N/Γ is t-connected. Moreover, any full
successors set in Γ is t-connected. A t-connected coalition is full t-connected, if it
together with its roots contains all successors of these roots. Observe that a full
t-connected coalition is the union of several full successors sets.
In what follows for a cycle-free digraph Γ on N and a coalition S ⊆ N , let
CΓt (S) denote the set of all t-connected subsets of S, [S/Γ ]
t the set of maximally
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t-connected subsets of S, called the t-connected components of S, and [S/Γ ]ti the
t-connected component of S containing player i ∈ S.
Since the communication is assumed to be one-way, we require for efficiency of
a value that the t-connected coalition consisting of one of the roots of the graph
together with all his successors realizes its worth. This gives the first property a
value must satisfy, what we call maximal-tree efficiency.
A value ξ on GΓN is maximal-tree efficient (MTE) if for every cycle-free digraph
game 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN it holds that∑
j∈S¯Γ (i)
ξj(v,Γ ) = v(S¯Γ (i)), for all i ∈ RΓ (N).
MTE generalizes the usual definition of efficiency for a tree. In a digraph with
only one topman, the maximal-tree efficiency just says that the total payoff should
be equal to the worth of the grand coalition. Still, MTE is not the productive
component efficiency condition. Different from the Myerson [7] case with undirected
communication graph we assume that not every productive component is able to
realize its exact capacity but only those with a tree structure. For example if one
worker works in two different divisions, the two managers of these firms and the
worker create a productive coalition. Yet, it is impossible to guarantee the efficiency
of this coalition because there is no communication link between the managers of
the two divisions.
The next property, what we call successor equivalence, says that if a link is
deleted, each successor of the terminus of this link still receives the same payoff.
A value ξ on GΓN is successor equivalent (SE) if for every cycle-free digraph game
〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN it holds that for all (i, j) ∈ Γ
ξk(v,Γ\(i, j)) = ξk(v,Γ ), for all k ∈ S¯Γ (j).
SE means that the payoff to any member in the full successors set of a player
does not change if any of the superiors of that player breaks his link to that player. It
implies that for each successors set the payoff distribution is completely determined
by the players of this set.
Along with MTE we consider a stronger efficiency property, what we call full-tree
efficiency, that requires that every full successors set realizes its worth.
A value ξ on GΓN is full-tree efficient (FTE) if for every cycle-free digraph game
〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN it holds that∑
j∈S¯Γ (i)
ξj(v,Γ ) = v(S¯Γ (i)), for all i ∈ N. (1)
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Proposition 1 On the class of cycle-free digraph games GΓN MTE and SE together
imply FTE.
Proof. Let ξ be a value on GΓN that meets MTE and SE, and let a cycle-free
digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN be arbitrarily chosen. For every i ∈ N the subgraph Γ
i
is a maximal tree in the subgraph Γ\
⋃
j∈OΓ (i)
{(j, i)}. Hence, due to MTE,
∑
j∈S¯Γ (i)
ξj(v,Γ\
⋃
k∈OΓ (i)
{(k, i)})
MTE
= v(S¯Γ (i)).
By successive application of SE,
ξj(v,Γ\
⋃
k∈OΓ (i)
{(k, i)})
SE
= ξj(v,Γ ), for all j ∈ S¯Γ (i).
Whence, ∑
j∈S¯Γ (i)
ξj(v,Γ ) = v(S¯Γ (i)), for all i ∈ N,
i.e., the value ξ meets FTE.
It turns out that MTE and SE uniquely define a value on the class of cycle-free
digraph games.
Theorem 1 On the class of cycle-free digraph games GΓN there is a unique value t
that satisfies MTE and SE. For every cycle-free digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN , the value
t(v,Γ ) satisfies the following conditions:
(i) it obeys the recursive equality
ti(v,Γ ) = v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
j∈SΓ (i)
tj(v,Γ ), for all i ∈ N ; (2)
(ii) it admits the explicit representation in the form
ti(v,Γ ) = v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
j∈SΓ (i)
κi(j)v(S¯Γ (j)), for all i ∈ N, (3)
where for all i ∈ N , j ∈ SΓ (i)
κi(j) =
n−2∑
r=0
(−1)rκri (j), (4)
and κri (j) is the number of tuples (i0, . . . , ir+1) such that i0 = i, ir+1 = j, ih ∈
SΓ (ih−1), h = 1, . . . , r + 1.
Proof. Due to Proposition 1 the value t on GΓN that satisfies MTE and SE meets
FTE as well, wherefrom the recursive equality (2) follows straightforwardly. Next,
we show that the representation in the form (2) is equivalent to the representation
in the form (3). According to (2) it holds for the value t that every player receives
what this player together with his successors can get on their own, their worth,
minus what all his successors will receive by themselves. Since the same property
7
holds for these successors as well, it is not difficult to see that (3) follows directly
from (2) by successive substitution. Indeed,
ti(v,Γ ) = v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
j∈SΓ (i)
tj(v,Γ )
(2)
=
v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
j∈SΓ (i)
v(S¯Γ (j)) +
∑
j∈SΓ (i)
∑
k∈SΓ (j)
tk(v,Γ )
(2)
=
v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
j∈SΓ (i)
v(S¯Γ (j)) +
∑
j∈SΓ (i)
∑
k∈SΓ (j)
v(S¯Γ (k))−
∑
j∈SΓ (i)
∑
k∈SΓ (j)
∑
h∈SΓ (k)
th(v,Γ )
(2)
=
. . . = v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
j∈SΓ (i)
n−2∑
r=0
(−1)rκri (j)v(S¯Γ (j)) = v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
j∈SΓ (i)
κi(j)v(S¯Γ (j)).
From (3), we obtain immediately that the value t meets SE, because in any di-
graph Γ for all (i, j) ∈ Γ and for every k ∈ S¯Γ (j) the full subtrees Γ
k and (Γ\(i, j))k
coincide. This completes the proof, since MTE follows from FTE automatically.
Corollary 1 According to (2) the tree value assigns to every player the worth of
his full successors set minus the total payoff to his successors. Wherefrom we obtain
a simple recursive algorithm for computing the tree value going upstream from the
leaves of the given digraph.
Observe that the computation of the coefficients κi(j), i ∈ N , j ∈ SΓ (i), in the
explicit formula representation (3) requires, in general, the enumeration of quite a
lot of possibilities. We show below that in many cases the coefficients κi(j) can
be easily computed and the value t can be presented in a computationally more
transparent and simpler form. Before formulating the next theorem we introduce
some additional notation.
For any digraph Γ on N and i ∈ N the set SΓ (i) of all successors of i can be
partitioned into three disjoint subsets F ∗
Γ
(i), S1
Γ
(i), and S2
Γ
(i), i.e.,
SΓ (i) = F
∗
Γ (i) ∪ S
1
Γ (i) ∪ S
2
Γ (i),
where both sets S1
Γ
(i) and S2
Γ
(i) are composed by successors of i that are not proper
subordinates of i. S1
Γ
(i) consists of any of them for which all paths from i to that
node j can be partitioned into a number of separate groups, might be only one group,
such that all paths in the same group have at least one common node different from
i and j and paths from different groups do not intersect between i and j, namely,
S1Γ (i) =
{
j ∈ SΓ (i)\F
∗
Γ (i) | ~PΓ (i, j) =
q⋃
h=1
~Ph, ~Ph∩~Pl = ∅, h 6= l :
∀h = 1, ..., q,∃kh ∈ S(~Ph)\{i, j} :
kh ∈ ~p,∀~p ∈ ~Ph and ~ph ∩ ~pl = {i, j},∀~ph ∈ ~Ph,∀~pl ∈ ~Pl, h 6= l
}
and
S2Γ (i) = SΓ (i) \
(
F ∗Γ (i) ∪ S
1
Γ (i)
)
.
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Remark that all j ∈ SΓ (i) \ F
∗
Γ
(i) with d i(j) = 1 belong to S1
Γ
(i) since the unique
proper superior of j belongs to all paths ~p ∈ ~PΓ (i, j); in particular, it holds that
j ∈ S1
Γ
(i), when there is only one path from i to j, i.e., when |~PΓ (i, j)| = 1. From
here besides it follows that for all j ∈ S2
Γ
(i), d i(j) > 1. For every j ∈ S1
Γ
(i) we
define the proper in-degree d˜ i(j) of j with respect to i as the number of groups ~Ph,
h = 1, ..., q, in the partition of ~PΓ (i, j).
Next, observe that for a given digraph Γ on N , for any i ∈ N and j ∈ SΓ (i),
all nodes forming a tuple (i0, ..., ir+1) in which i0 = i, ir+1 = j, ih ∈ SΓ (ih−1),
h = 1, ..., r + 1, belong to the same directed path ~p ∈ ~PΓ (i, j). Wherefrom it easily
follows that for all i ∈ N and j ∈ SΓ (i), κi(j) given by (4) in fact is defined via
tuples of nodes from the set of nodes S(~PΓ (i, j)) that determine the set of directed
paths ~PΓ (i, j). Similar to the definition of κi(j) given by (4), for any subset of nodes
M ⊆ S(~PΓ (i, j)) containing nodes i and j, we may define
κi(M ; j) =
n−2∑
r=0
(−1)rκri (M ; j), (5)
where κri (M ; j) counts only the tuples (i0, ..., ir+1) for which i0 = i, ir+1 = j, and
ih ∈ SΓ (ih−1)∩M , h = 1, . . . , r+1. Remark that κi(j) = κi(S(~PΓ (i, j)); j). The sub-
set of S(~PΓ (i, j)) composed by i, j, all proper subordinates h ∈ F
∗
Γ
(i) ∩ S(~PΓ (i, j))
and all proper intersection points in S(~PΓ (i, j)) is called the upper covering set for
~PΓ (i, j) and denoted MΓ (i, j). It turns out that on F
∗
Γ
(i) and S1
Γ
(i) the exact value
of κi(j) can be simply computed, while on S
2
Γ
(i) the computation of κi(j) can be
reduced to the enumeration only over the nodes from the upper covering set for
~PΓ (i, j). For simplicity of notation we denote κi(MΓ (i, j); j) by κ
M
i (j).
Theorem 2 For every cycle-free digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN the value t given by (3)
admits the equivalent representation in the form
ti(v,Γ ) = v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
j∈F ∗
Γ
(i)
v(S¯Γ (j))+
+
∑
j∈S1
Γ
(i)
(d˜ i(j)− 1)v(S¯Γ (j))−
∑
j∈S2
Γ
(i)
κMi (j)v(S¯Γ (j)), for all i ∈ N. (6)
If the consideration is restricted to only strongly cycle-free digraph games, then
the above representation reduces to
ti(v,Γ ) = v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
j∈FΓ (i)
v(S¯Γ (j)), for all i ∈ N. (7)
For rooted-forest digraph games defined by rooted forest digraph structures that
are strongly cycle-free, the value given by (7) coincides with the tree value intro-
duced first under the name of hierarchical outcome in Demange [3], where it is also
shown that under the mild condition of superadditivity it belongs to the core of the
restricted game defined in Myerson [7]. More recently, the tree value for rooted-
forest games was used as a basic element in the construction of the average tree
solution for cycle-free undirected graph games in Herings et al. [5]. In Khmel-
nitskaya [6] it is shown that if a directed link is assumed to be a fully developed
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communication link, i.e., if every connected coalition is assumed to be productive,
then on the class of rooted-forest digraph games the tree value can be characterized
via component efficiency and successor equivalence; moreover, it is shown that the
class of rooted-forest digraph games is the maximal subclass in the class of strongly
cycle-free digraph games where this axiomatization holds true.
From now on we refer to the value t given by (3), or equivalently by (6), as to
the root-tree value, or simply the tree value, for cycle-free digraph games. The tree
value assigns to every player the payoff equal to the worth of his full successors set
minus the worths of all full successors sets of his proper subordinates plus or minus
the worths of all full successors sets of any other of his successors that are subtracted
or added more than once. Moreover, for any player i ∈ N and his successor j ∈ N
that is not his proper subordinate, the coefficient κi(j) indicates the number of
overlappings of full successors sets of all proper subordinates of i at node j. In fact
a player receives what he contributes when he joins his successors when only the full
successors sets, that are the only efficient productive coalitions, are counted. Since
a leaf has no successors, a leaf just gets his own worth. Besides, it is worth to note
and not difficult to check that the right sides of both formulas (6) and (7) being
considered with respect not to coalitional worths but to players in these coalitions
contain only player i when taking into account all pluses and minuses.
The validity of the first statement of Theorem 2 follows directly from Theorem 1
and Lemma 1 below. The second statement follows easily from the first one. Indeed,
in any strongly cycle-free digraph Γ all links are essential and d i(j) = 1 for all
i ∈ N , j ∈ SΓ (i). Whence it easily follows that F
∗
Γ
(i) = FΓ (i), S
2
Γ
(i) = ∅, and
d˜ i(j) = d i(j) = 1 for all j ∈ S1
Γ
(i).
Lemma 1 For a given digraph Γ on N , the coefficients κi(j), i ∈ N , j ∈ SΓ (i),
defined by (4) satisfy the following properties:
(i) if a link (k, l)∈Γ is inessential, then for all i∈N and j∈SΓ (i), κi(j) defined
on Γ is equal to κi(j) defined on Γ\(k, l);
(ii) κi(j) = 1 for all i ∈ N , j ∈ F
∗
Γ
(i);
(iii) κi(j) = −d˜
i(j) + 1 for all i ∈ N , j ∈ S1
Γ
(i);
(iv) κi(j)=κ
M
i (j) for all i∈N and j∈SΓ (i).
Proof.
(i). It is sufficient to prove the statement only in case when k ∈ SΓ (i) and
j ∈ SΓ (l). Let ~p ∈ ~PΓ (i, j) be such that ~p ∋ (k, l). By definition of an inessential
link there exists ~p0 ∈ ~PΓ (k, l) such that ~p0 6= (k, l). It is not difficult to see that the
path ~p1 = ~p\(k, l) ∪ ~p0 obtained from the path ~p by replacing the link (k, l) by the
path ~p0 belongs to ~PΓ (i, j), and moreover, all tuples (i0, ..., ir+1) in the definition of
κi(j) that belong to ~p also belong to ~p1. Whence it follows straightforwardly that
deleting an inessential link does not change the value of κi(j).
(ii). If j ∈ F ∗
Γ
(i), then ~PΓ (i, j) contains only the path ~p = (i, j) and the only
tuple (i0, ..., ir+1) is (i, j) with r = 0. Wherefrom it follows that κi(j) = 1.
(iii). Let j ∈ S1
Γ
(i). First consider the case when d˜ i(j) = 1. Then there
exists k ∈ S(~PΓ (i, j)), k 6= i, j, such that k ∈ ~p for all ~p ∈ ~PΓ (i, j). By definition,
10
κri (j) is equal to the number of tuples (i0, . . . , ir+1) such that i0 = i, ir+1 = j,
ih ∈ SΓ (ih−1), h = 1, . . . , r + 1, or equivalently, κ
r
i (j) is equal to the number of
these tuples (i0, . . . , ir+1) that do not contain k plus the number of these tuples
(i0, . . . , ir+1) that contain k. Notice that since k ∈ ~p for all ~p ∈ ~PΓ (i, j), for every
r-tuple (i0, . . . , ir+1) that does not contain k there exists a uniquely defined (r+2)-
tuple composed by the same nodes plus the node k. From which together with
equality (4) it follows that κi(j) = 0.
Let now d˜ i(j) > 1. Then ~PΓ (i, j) =
q⋃
h=1
~Ph with q = d˜
i(j) and there exist nodes
kh 6= i, j, h = 1, ..., q such that kh ∈ ~p for all paths ~p ∈ ~Ph and all paths ~ph ∈ ~Ph
and ~pl ∈ ~Pl, h 6= l, intersect only at i and j. We may split the computation of κi(j)
by the computation via groups of paths ~Ph excluding on each step the tuples that
were counted at the previous steps, i.e.,
κi(j) = κi(S(~P1); j) + [κi(S(~P2); j)− κi(S(~P1 ∩ ~P2; j)] + . . .
. . .+ [κi(S(~Pq); j)− κi(S(
q⋂
h=1
~Ph); j)].
Applying the same argument as in the proof of the case when d˜ i(j) = 1, we obtain
that for all h = 1, . . . , q,
κi(S(~Ph); j) = 0.
Since the paths from different groups ~Ph do not intersect between i and j, only tuple
(i0, i1) = (i, j) with r = 0 belongs to all ~p ∈ ~PΓ (i, j). Therefore, for all h = 2, . . . , q,
κi(S(
h⋂
h=1
~Ph); j) = −1.
Then the validity of (iii) follows immediately from the last three equalities.
(iv). If MΓ (i, j) 6= S(~PΓ (i, j)), consider arbitrary k ∈ S(~PΓ (i, j))\MΓ (i, j). We
may split the computation of κi(j) into two parts:
κi(j) = κi(j; k) + κi(S(~PΓ (i, j)) \ {k}; j),
where κi(j; k) is computed via tuples (i0, . . . , ir+1) ∋ k and κi(S(~PΓ (i, j))\{k}; j) is
computed via tuples (i0, . . . , ir+1) ⊂ S(~PΓ (i, j)) \ {k}, i.e., tuples (i0, . . . , ir+1) 6∋ k.
By definition of a covering set, MΓ (i, j) contains predecessors of k, i.e., MΓ (i, j) ∩
PΓ (k) 6= ∅. Moreover, since k /∈ MΓ (i, j), i.e., k is neither a proper subordinate
of i nor a proper intersection point in the subgraph Γ|S(~PΓ (i,j)), there exists h ∈
MΓ (i, j) ∩ PΓ (k) that belongs to all paths ~p ∈ ~PΓ (i, j), ~p ∋ k. Applying the same
argument as above in the proof of the statement (iii), now with respect to h, we
obtain that κi(j; k) = 0. Thus κi(j) = κi(S(~PΓ (i, j))\{k}; j). Repeating the same
reasoning successively with respect to all k′ ∈ S(~PΓ (i, j)) \
(
MΓ (i, j) ∪ {k}
)
we
obtain κi(j)=κi(MΓ (i, j); j)
def
= κMi (j).
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Example 1 The examples of digraphs given in Figure 1 demonstrate the more
complicated situation with the computation of coefficients κi(j) when j ∈ S
2
Γ
(i) for
some i ∈ N .
1
2 3 4
5 6
7
a)
1
2 3
4 5
6
b)
1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8
c)
Figure 1
Figure 1,a: 7 ∈ S2
Γ
(1), d 1(7) = 2, κ1(7) = 0;
Figure 1,b: 6 ∈ S2
Γ
(1), d 1(6) = 2, κ1(6) = 1.
Figure 1,c: 8 ∈ S2
Γ
(1), d 1(8) = 2, κ1(8) = −1.
Example 2 Figure 2 provides an example of the tree value for a 10-person game
with cycle-free but not strongly cycle-free digraph structure.
1 2
10
3 4
5
6
7
8 9
v(13456789, 10)−v(356789)−v(46789)−
−v(689, 10)+2v(689)+v(78)−v(8)
v(246789, 10)−v(46789)−
−v(689, 10)+v(689)
v(356789)−v(56789)
v(46789)−v(689)−v(78)+v(8)
v(56789)−v(689)−v(78)+v(8)
v(689)−v(8)−v(9)
v(78)−v(8)
v(8) v(9)
v(689, 10)−v(689)
Figure 2
The tree valuemay be computed in two differentways, either by the recursive algorithm
based on the recursive equality (2) or using the explicit formula representation (6).
We explain in detail the computation of t1(v,Γ ) based on the explicit representation
given by (6):
S¯Γ (1) = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}.
12
3, 4, 10 ∈ F ∗
Γ
(1) =⇒ κ1(3) = κ1(4) = κ1(10) = 1.
5, 6, 7, 9 ∈ S1
Γ
(1), d 1(5) = d 1(9) = 1, d 1(6) = 3, d 1(7) = 2 =⇒ κ1(5) = κ1(9) =
0, κ1(6)=−2, κ1(7)=−1.
8 ∈ S2
Γ
(1):
~PΓ (1, 8) =
{
~p1 = (1, 3, 5, 7, 8), ~p2 = (1, 3, 5, 6, 8), ~p3 = (1, 10, 6, 8),
~p4 = (1, 4, 7, 8), ~p5 = (1, 4, 6, 8), ~p6 = (1, 3, 8)
}
;
we eliminate the path ~p6 since it contains inessential link (3, 8);
M = {1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10} is a minimal covering set for ~PΓ (1, 8);
κ1(~p1; 8) = 0;
~p2\~p1 contains tuples (1, 6, 8) and (1, 5, 6, 8) =⇒ κ1(~p2\~p1; 8) = 0;
~p3\(~p1 ∪ ~p2) contains tuples (1, 10, 8), (1, 10, 6, 8)) =⇒ κ1(~p3\(~p1 ∪ ~p2); 8) = 0;
~p4\(~p1 ∪ ~p2 ∪ ~p3) contains (1, 4, 8), (1, 4, 7, 8)) =⇒ κ1(~p4\(~p1 ∪ ~p2 ∪ ~p3); 8) = 0;
~p5\(~p1 ∪ ~p2 ∪ ~p3 ∪ ~p4) contains (1, 4, 6, 8)) =⇒ κ1(~p5\(~p1 ∪ ~p2 ∪ ~p3 ∪ ~p4); 8) = 1;
=⇒ κ1(8) = 1.
t1(v,Γ ) = v(13456789, 10)−v(356789)−v(46789)−v(689, 10)+2v(689)+v(78)−v(8).
Example 3 Figure 3 gives an example of the tree value for a 10-person game with
strongly cycle-free digraph structure.
1 2
10
3 4
5
6
7
8 9
v(13456789)− v(356789) v(24689)− v(4689)
v(10, 356789)− v(356789)
v(356789)− v(56789) v(4689)− v(689)
v(56789)− v(7)− v(689)
v(689)− v(8)− v(9)
v(7)
v(8) v(9)
Figure 3
It turns out that the tree value not only meets FTE but FTE alone uniquely
defines the tree value on the class of cycle-free digraph games.
Theorem 3 On the class of cycle-free digraph games GΓN the tree value is the unique
value that satisfies FTE.
Proof. Since the tree value satisfies FTE, to prove the theorem it is enough to show
that the tree value is the unique value that meets FTE on GΓN . Let a value ξ on G
Γ
N
satisfy axiom FTE. Then, because of FTE, (1) holds for every 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN . Every
digraph Γ under consideration is cycle-free, i.e., no player in N appears to be a
successor of itself. Hence, due to the arbitrariness of game 〈v,Γ 〉, the n equalities in
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(1) are independent. Therefore, we have a system of n independent linear equalities
with respect to n variables ξj(v,Γ ) which uniquely determines the value ξ(v,Γ ) that
in this case coincides with t(v,Γ ).
Corollary 2 FTE on the class of cycle-free digraph games GΓN implies not only
MTE but SE as well.
3.2 Overall efficiency and stability
In this subsection we consider efficiency and stability of the tree value. First we
derive for the tree value the total payoff for any t-connected coalition.
Theorem 4 In a cycle-free digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN , for any t-connected coalition
S ∈ CΓt (N) it holds that∑
i∈S
ti(v,Γ ) =
∑
i∈RΓ (S)
v(S¯Γ (i))−
−
∑
i∈S\RΓ (S)
(
κS(i)−1
)
v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
i∈S¯Γ (S)\S
κS(i)v(S¯Γ (i)), (8)
where
S¯Γ (S) =
⋃
i∈RΓ (S)
S¯Γ (i),
κS(i) =
∑
j∈P¯Γ (i)∩S¯Γ (S)
κj(i), for all i ∈ S¯Γ (S),
while κS(i) = 1 when dN (i) = 1, where for any t-connected coalition S ∈ C
Γ
t (N),
for all i ∈ S¯Γ (S), dS(i) is the in-degree of i in the subgraph Γ |S¯Γ (S), i.e.,
dS(i) = |OΓ (i) ∩ S¯Γ (S)|,
in particular, dN (i) = dΓ (i) for all i ∈ N .
If the consideration is restricted to only strongly cycle-free digraph games, then
for any t-connected coalition S ∈ CΓt (N) it holds that∑
i∈S
ti(v,Γ ) =
∑
i∈RΓ (S)
v(S¯Γ (i))−
−
∑
i∈S\RΓ (S)
(
dS(i)−1
)
v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
i∈RΓ (S¯Γ (S)\S)
dS(i)v(S¯Γ (i)). (9)
Proof. Let 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN be a cycle-free digraph game and let S be any t-connected
coalition S ∈ CΓt (N). Then it holds that
∑
i∈S
ti(v,Γ )
(3)
=
∑
i∈S
(
v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
j∈SΓ (i)
κi(j)v(S¯Γ (j))
)
=
=
∑
i∈RΓ (S)
v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
i∈S\RΓ (S)
( ∑
j∈SΓ (i)
(κi(j)−1
)
v(S¯Γ (i))
)
−
∑
i∈S¯Γ (S)\S
( ∑
j∈SΓ (i)
κi(j)v(S¯Γ (i))
)
.
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Since for all i, j ∈ S with j ∈ SΓ (i) every path from i to j belongs to S, (8) follows
straightforwardly from the last equality.
Next, if dN (i) = 1, then due to Lemma 1 for all j ∈
(
P¯Γ (i) ∩ S¯Γ (S)
)
\FΓ (i),
d j(i) = 0 and therefore κj(i) = 0, and for j ∈ FΓ (i) ∩ S¯Γ (S), κj(i) = 1.
In case Γ is a strongly cycle-free digraph, it holds that
∑
i∈S
ti(v,Γ )
(7)
=
∑
i∈S
(
v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
j∈FΓ (i)
v(S¯Γ (j))
)
=
=
∑
i∈RΓ (S)
v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
i∈S\RΓ (S)
(
dS(i)−1
)
v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
j∈FΓ (i)
i∈S, j /∈S
dS(j)v(S¯Γ (j)).
To complete the proof of (9) it suffices to notice that, since Γ a strongly cycle-free
digraph, every subordinate j∈FΓ (i) of i∈S that does not belong to S is a root in
S¯Γ (S)\S.
From Theorem 4 it follows that for any cycle-free digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN the
overall efficiency is given by∑
i∈N
ti(v,Γ ) =
∑
i∈RΓ (N)
v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
i∈N\RΓ (N)
(
κN (i)−1
)
v(S¯Γ (i)), (10)
while if the consideration is restricted to only strongly cycle-free digraph games,
(10) reduces to∑
i∈N
ti(v,Γ ) =
∑
i∈RΓ (N)
v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
i∈N\RΓ (N)
(
dΓ (i)−1
)
v(S¯Γ (i)). (11)
To support these expressions we recall the Myerson model in [7] of a game
with undirected cooperation structure, in which the component efficiency entails
the equality ∑
i∈N
ξi(v,Γ ) =
∑
C∈N/Γ
v(C). (12)
While the right-side expression in (12) is composed by connected components that
are the only efficient productive elements in the Myerson’s model, the building bricks
in (10) and (11) are the full successors sets which are the only efficient productive
coalitions under the assumption of tree connectedness. Observe also that for strongly
cycle-free rooted-forest digraph games (11) reduces to (12),∑
i∈N
ti(v,Γ ) =
∑
i∈RΓ (N)
v(S¯Γ (i)) =
∑
C∈N/Γ
v(C).
For a cycle-free digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN , we define the t-core C
t(v,Γ ) as the
set of component efficient payoff vectors that are not dominated by any t-connected
coalition,
Ct(v,Γ ) = {x ∈ IRN | x(C) = v(C),∀C ∈ N/Γ ; x(S) ≥ v(S),∀S ∈ CΓt (N)}, (13)
while the weak t-core C˜t(v,Γ ) is the set of weakly component efficient payoff vectors
that are not dominated by any t-connected coalition,
C˜t(v,Γ ) = {x ∈ IRN | x(C) ≤ v(C),∀C ∈ N/Γ ; x(S) ≥ v(S),∀S ∈ CΓt (N)}. (14)
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Theorem 5 The tree value on the subclass of superadditive rooted-forest digraph
games is stable.
Proof. Let 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN be a superadditive rooted-forest digraph game arbitrarily
chosen. We show that the tree value t(v,Γ ) belongs to the core Ct(v,Γ ). Consider
arbitrary C ∈ N/Γ , then C is a tree. Let i ∈ C be a root in Γ , then C = S¯Γ (i)
because of the rooted-forest structure of Γ . Due to the full-tree efficiency of the tree
value, it holds that ∑
j∈S¯Γ (i)
tj(v,Γ )
FTE
= v(S¯Γ (i)),
wherefrom it follows that ∑
j∈C
tj(v,Γ ) = v(C).
Let now S ∈ CΓt (N). Because of the rooted-forest structure of Γ , it holds that
dN (i) = 1 for all i ∈ N\RΓ (N). Wherefrom it follows that Γ |S contains exactly
one root, say, node i, Γ |S is a subtree, and S ⊆ S¯Γ (i). Moreover, since Γ is
strongly cycle-free, Γ |S¯Γ (i) is a full subtree, and because of the tree structure of Γ |S ,
Γ |S¯Γ (i)\S consists of a collection (might be empty) of disconnected full subtrees, i.e.,
Γ |S¯Γ (i)\S =
⋃q
k=1 Tk where Tk
⋂
Tl = ∅, k 6= l, and q = |[S¯Γ (i)\S]/Γ | is the number
of components in S¯Γ (i)\S. Hence,
S¯Γ (i) = S ∪
q⋃
k=1
Tk.
Applying again the full-tree efficiency of the tree value, we obtain that∑
j∈S¯Γ (i)
tj(v,Γ )
FTE
= v(S¯Γ (i)),
and ∑
j∈Tk
tj(v,Γ )
FTE
= v(Tk), for all k = 1, . . . , q.
From the superadditivity of v and the last three equalities, it follows that
∑
j∈S
tj(v,Γ ) = v(S¯Γ (i))−
q∑
k=1
v(Tk) ≥ v(S).
Remark 1 The statement of Theorem 5 can also be obtained as a corollary of
the stability result proved in Demange [3]. Indeed, in a rooted forest every con-
nected component has a tree structure and, therefore, is t-connected. Whence, for
any rooted-forest digraph game the t-core coincides with the core of the Myerson
restricted game.
However, the following examples show that for a superadditive digraph game the
requirement on the digraph to be a rooted forest is non-reducible. In Example 4
the tree value of a superadditive cycle-free but not strongly cycle-free digraph game
violates individual rationality and, therefore, does not meet the second constraint
of the weak core, while in Example 5 the tree value of a superadditive strongly
cycle-free game in which the graph contains two roots violates weak efficiency.
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Example 4 Consider a 4-person cycle-free superadditive digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 with
v(24) = v(34) = v(234) = v(N) = 1, v(S) = 0 otherwise, and Γ given in Figure 4.
1
2 3
4
Figure 4
Then t(v,Γ ) = (−1, 1, 1, 0), whence t1(v,Γ ) = −1 < 0 = v(1).
Example 5 Consider a 3-person cycle-free superadditive digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 with
v(12) = v(13) = v(N) = 1, v(S) = 0 otherwise, and Γ given in Figure 5.
1 2
3
Figure 5
Then t(v,Γ ) = (1, 1, 0), whence t1(v,Γ ) + t2(v,Γ ) + t3(v,Γ ) = 2 > 1 = v(N).
A cycle-free digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 is t-convex, if for all t-connected coalitions
T,Q ⊂ CΓt (N) such that T is a full t-connected set, Q is a full successors set, and
T ∪Q ∈ CΓt (N), it holds that
v(T ) + v(Q) ≤ v(T ∪Q) + v(T ∩Q). (15)
Theorem 6 The tree value on the subclass of t-convex strongly cycle-free digraph
games is weakly efficient.
Proof. Let 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN be any t-convex strongly cycle-free digraph game. Assume
that Γ is connected, otherwise we apply the same argument to any component
C ∈ N/Γ . If there is only one root in Γ , it holds that
∑n
i=1 ti(v,Γ ) = v(N) and the
tree value is even efficient. So, suppose that there are q different roots r1, . . . , rq in
Γ for some q ≥ 2. Since Γ is connected, the roots in Γ can be ordered in such a
way that
j−1⋃
h=1
S¯Γ (rh) ∩ S¯Γ (rj) 6= ∅, for j = 2, ..., q.
For j = 1, ..., q let Tj =
⋃j
h=1 S¯Γ (rh). Then from the strongly cycle-freeness of Γ it
follows that for j = 2, ..., q there exists a unique ij ∈ N such that
Tj−1 ∩ S¯Γ (rj) = S¯Γ (ij).
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By t-convexity of the digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 it holds that
v(Tj−1) + v(S¯Γ (rj)) ≤ v(Tj) + v(S¯Γ (ij)), for j = 2, ..., q.
Since T1 = S¯Γ (r1) and Tq = N , then applying the last inequality successively q − 1
times we obtain
q∑
j=1
v(S¯Γ (rj)) ≤ v(N) +
q∑
j=2
v(S¯Γ (ij)).
Hence,
v(N)≥
q∑
j=1
v(S¯Γ (rj))−
q∑
j=2
v(S¯Γ (ij)).
Since Γ is strongly cycle-free, for any i ∈ N\RΓ (N), node i has dΓ (i) different roots
as predecessor, which implies that the term v(S¯Γ (i)) appears precisely dΓ (i) − 1
times. Therefore,
v(N) ≥
∑
i∈RΓ (N)
v(S¯Γ (i))−
∑
i∈N\RΓ (N)
(
dΓ (i)−1
)
v(S¯Γ (i)).
The following example of a convex strongly cycle-free digraph game shows that
even under the assumption of convexity of a given digraph game, which is stronger
than t-convexity, one or more constraints for not being dominated in the definition
of the week core might be violated by the tree value, and therefore, the tree value
is not weakly stable.
Example 6 Consider a 5-person cycle-free convex digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 with v(N) =
10, v(123) = v(1234) = v(1235) = 3, v(1345) = v(2345) = 2, v(S) = 0 otherwise,
and the strongly cycle-free digraph Γ given in Figure 6.
1 2
1
4 5
Figure 6
Then t(v,Γ ) = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0), whence, t1(v,Γ ) + t2(v,Γ ) + t3(v,Γ )=2<3=v(123).
From (10) it follows that for a cycle-free (for simplicity connected) digraph game
〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN a necessary and sufficient condition for the weak efficiency of the tree
value is that
∑
i∈RΓ (N)
v(S¯Γ (i)) ≤ v(N) +
∑
i∈N\RΓ (N)
(
κN (i)−1
)
v(S¯Γ (i)). (16)
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Since N =
⋃
i∈RΓ (N)
S¯Γ (i), the grand coalition equals the union of the successors sets
of all roots in the graph Γ . In case there is only one root in Γ , condition (16) is
redundant, because the left side is then equal to v(N). In case there is more than
one root in Γ , the different successors sets of the roots of Γ will intersect each other
and for any i ∈ N\RΓ (N) the number κN (i) − 1 is the number of times that the
successors set S¯Γ (i) of node i equals the intersection of successors sets of the roots of
Γ . Therefore, condition (16) is a kind of convexity condition for the grand coalition
saying that the sum of the worths of the successors sets of all the roots of the graph
should be less than or equal to the worth of the grand coalition (their union) plus
the total worths of their intersections. In a firm where any full successors set of a
root is a division within the firm and subdivisions that are intersections of several
divisions are shared by these divisions, in (16) the left-side minus the sum in the
right-side can be economically interpreted as the total worths of the divisions when
they do not cooperate, while v(N) is the worth of the firm when the divisions do
cooperate. To have weak efficiency the latter value should be at least equal to the
former value. Remark that v(N) minus the total payoff at the tree value can be
interpreted as the net profit of the firm (or the synergy effect from cooperation) that
can be given to its shareholders.
3.3 Sink connectedness
We consider now another scenario of controlling cooperation in case of directed
communication and assume that in any coalition each player may be controlled
only by his successors and that nobody accepts that his former superior becomes
his equal partner if a coalition forms. This entails the assumption that the only
productive coalitions are the so-called sink connected, or simply s-connected, being
the connected coalitions S ∈ CΓ (N) that meet also the condition that for every leaf
i∈LΓ (S) it holds that i /∈PΓ (j) for another leaf j ∈LΓ (S). Similar to the case of
tree connectedness, every s-connected coalition inherits the subordination of play-
ers prescribed by Γ in N , every component C ∈ N/Γ is s-connected, and any full
predecessors set in Γ is s-connected. We say that an s-connected coalition is full
s-connected, if it together with its leaves contains all predecessors of these leaves.
Observe that a full s-connected coalition is the union of several full predecessors sets.
For a cycle-free digraph Γ on N and a coalition S ⊆N , let CΓs (S) denote the set
of all s-connected subcoalitions of S, [S/Γ ]s the set of maximally s-connected sub-
coalitions of S, called the s-connected components of S, and [S/Γ ]si the s-connected
component of S containing player i ∈ S.
For efficiency of a value we require that each leaf of the given communication
digraph together with all his predecessors realizes the total worth they possess.
This generates the first property a value must satisfy, what we call maximal-sink
efficiency.
A value ξ on GΓN is maximal-sink efficient (MSE) if for every cycle-free digraph
game 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN it holds that∑
j∈P¯Γ (i)
ξj(v,Γ ) = v(P¯Γ (i)), for all i ∈ LΓ (N).
The next property, called the predecessor equivalence, says that if a directed
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link is broken, each member of the full predecessors set of the origin of this link still
receives the same payoff.
A value ξ on GΓN is predecessor equivalent (PE) if for every cycle-free digraph
game 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN it holds that for all (i, j) ∈ Γ
ξk(v,Γ\(i, j)) = ξk(v,Γ ), for all k ∈ P¯Γ (i).
Along with MSE we consider a stronger efficiency property, what we call full-sink
efficiency, that requires that every full predecessors set realizes its worth.
A value ξ on GΓN is full-sink efficient (FSE) if for every cycle-free digraph game
〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN it holds that∑
j∈P¯Γ (i)
ξj(v,Γ ) = v(P¯Γ (i)), for all i ∈ N.
It is easy to see that the assumption of sink connectedness in digraph Γ is
equivalent to the assumption of tree connectedness in the digraph Γ˜ composed by
the same set of links as Γ but with the opposite orientation. Moreover, each of
axioms MSE, FSE and PE with respect to any cycle-free digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN
is equivalent to the corresponding MTE, FTE or SE axiom with respect to the
digraph game 〈v, Γ˜ 〉. In case of sink connectedness the last two observations allow
to obtain the following results straightforwardly from the results proved above in
Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 under the assumption of tree connectedness.
Proposition 2 On the class of cycle-free digraph games GΓN MSE and PE together
imply FSE.
MSE and PE uniquely define a value on the class of cycle-free digraph games.
Theorem 7 On the class of cycle-free digraph games GΓN there is a unique value s
that satisfies MSE and PE. For every cycle-free digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN , the value
s(v,Γ ) satisfies the following conditions:
(i) it obeys the recursive equality
si(v,Γ ) = v(P¯Γ (i))−
∑
j∈PΓ (i)
sj(v,Γ ), for all i ∈ N ; (17)
(ii) it admits the explicit representation in the form
si(v,Γ ) = v(P¯Γ (i))−
∑
j∈PΓ (i)
κ˜i(j)v(P¯Γ (j)), for all i ∈ N, (18)
where for all i ∈ N , j ∈ PΓ (i),
κ˜i(j) =
n−2∑
r=0
(−1)rκ˜ri (j), (19)
and κ˜ri (j) is the number of tuples (i0, . . . , ir+1) such that i0 = j, ir+1 = i, ih ∈
PΓ (ih−1), h = 1, . . . , r + 1.
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Before stating the next theorem providing simpler explicit representation of the
value s we introduce some additional notions and notation. Let
P 1Γ (i) =
{
j ∈ PΓ (i)\O
∗
Γ (i) | ~PΓ (j, i) =
q⋃
h=1
~Ph, ~Ph∩~Pl = ∅, h 6= l :
∀h = 1, ..., q,∃kh ∈ S(~Ph)\{j, i} :
kh ∈ ~p,∀~p ∈ ~Ph and ~ph ∩ ~pl = {j, i},∀~ph ∈ ~Ph,∀~pl ∈ ~Pl, h 6= l
}
;
and
P 2Γ (i) = PΓ (i) \
(
O∗Γ (i) ∪ P
1
Γ (i)
)
.
Both sets P 1
Γ
(i) and P 2
Γ
(i) are composed by predecessors of i that are not proper
superiors of i. P 1
Γ
(i) consists of any such j for which all paths from j to i can be
partitioned into a number of separate groups, might be only one group, such that
all paths in the same group have at least one common node different from j and i
and paths from different groups do not intersect between j and i. Notice that all
j ∈ PΓ (i)\O
∗
Γ
(i) with di(j) = 1 belong to P
1
Γ
(i) since the unique proper subordinate
of j belongs to all paths ~p ∈ ~PΓ (j, i); in particular, it holds that j ∈ P
1
Γ
(i), when
there is only one path from j to i, i.e., when |~PΓ (j, i)| = 1. From here besides it
follows that for all j ∈ P 2
Γ
(i), di(j) > 1. For every j ∈ P
1
Γ
(i) we define the proper
out-degree d˜i(j) of j with respect to i as the number of groups ~Ph, h = 1, ..., q, in
the partition of ~PΓ (j, i). The subset of M˜Γ (j, i) ⊆ S(~PΓ (j, i)), j ∈ PΓ (i), composed
by j, i, all proper intersection points in S(~PΓ (j, i)) and all proper superiors h ∈
O∗
Γ
(i) ∩ S(~PΓ (j, i)) we call the lower covering set for ~PΓ (j, i). Similarly to the
definition of κ˜i(j) given by (19) we define
κ˜Mi (j) =
n−2∑
r=0
(−1)rκ˜r,Mi (j),
where κ˜r,Mi (j) counts only the tuples (i0, ..., ir+1) for which i0 = j, ir+1 = i, and
ih ∈ PΓ (ih−1) ∩ M˜Γ (j, i), h = 1, . . . , r + 1.
Theorem 8 For every cycle-free digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN the value s given by
(18) admits the equivalent representation in the form
si(v,Γ ) = v(P¯Γ (i))−
∑
j∈O∗
Γ
(i)
v(P¯Γ (j))+
+
∑
j∈P 1
Γ
(i)
(d˜ i(j)− 1)v(P¯Γ (j))−
∑
j∈P 2
Γ
(i)
κ˜Mi (j)v(P¯Γ (j)), for all i ∈ N. (20)
If the consideration is restricted to only strongly cycle-free digraph games, then
the above representation reduces to
si(v,Γ ) = v(P¯Γ (i))−
∑
j∈OΓ (i)
v(P¯Γ (j)), for all i ∈ N. (21)
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For sink-forest digraph games defined by sink forest digraph structures that are
strongly cycle-free, the value given by (21) coincides with the sink value introduced
in Khmelnitskaya [6]. By that reason from now on we refer to the value s given by
(18), or equivalently by (20), as to the sink-tree value, or simply the sink value, for
cycle-free digraph games.
The sink value assigns to every player the payoff equal to the worth of his full
predecessors set minus the worths of all full predecessors sets of his proper superiors
plus or minus the worths of all full predecessors sets of any other of his predecessors
that are subtracted or added more than once. Moreover, for any player i ∈ N and
his predecessor j ∈ N that is not his proper superior, the coefficient κ˜i(j) indicates
the number of overlappings of full predecessors sets of all proper superiors of i at
node j. In fact a player receives what he contributes when he joins his predecessors
when only the full predecessors sets, that are the only efficient productive coalitions
under given assumptions, are counted. Since a root has no predecessors, a root just
gets his own worth. Furthermore, it is not difficult to check that the right-sides of
both formulas (20) and (21) being considered with respect not to coalitional worths
but to players in these coalitions contain only player i when taking into account all
pluses and minuses. Besides, according to (17) the sink value assigns to every player
the worth of his full predecessors set minus the total payoff to his predecessors.
Wherefrom we obtain a simple recursive algorithm for computing the sink value
going downstream from the roots of the given digraph.
Example 7 Figure 7 provides an example of the sink value for a 10-person game
with cycle-free but not strongly cycle-free digraph structure.
The sink value may be computed in two different ways, either by the recursive
algorithm based on the recursive equality (17), or using the explicit formula repre-
sentation (20).
1 2
10
3 4
5
6
7
8 9
v(1) v(2)
v(13)−v(1)
v(124)−v(1)−v(2)
v(135)−v(13)
v(123456, 10)−v(135)−v(124)−
−v(12, 10)+2v(1)+v(2)
v(123457)−v(135)−
−v(124)+v(1)
v(12345678, 10)−v(123457)−
−v(123456, 10)+v(135)+v(124)+v(1) v(12343569, 10)−v(123456, 10)
v(12, 10)−v(1)−v(2)
Figure 7
The sink value not only meets FSE but FSE alone uniquely defines the sink value
on the class of cycle-free digraph games.
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Theorem 9 On the class of cycle-free digraph games GΓN the sink value is the unique
value that satisfies FSE.
Corollary 3 FSE on the class of cycle-free digraph games GΓN implies not only MSE
but PE as well.
The next theorem derives the total sink value payoff for any s-connected coali-
tion.
Theorem 10 In a cycle-free digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN , for any s-connected coali-
tion S ∈ CΓs (N) it holds that∑
i∈S
si(v,Γ ) =
∑
i∈LΓ (S)
v(P¯Γ (i))−
∑
i∈S\LΓ (S)
(
κ˜S(i)−1
)
v(P¯Γ (i))−
∑
i∈P¯Γ (S)\S
κ˜S(i)v(P¯Γ (i)),
where
P¯Γ (S) =
⋃
i∈LΓ (S)
P¯Γ (i),
κ˜S(i) =
∑
j∈S¯Γ (i)∩P¯Γ (S)
κ˜j(i), for all i ∈ P¯Γ (S),
while κ˜S(i) = 1 when d˜N (i) = 1, where for any s-connected coalition S ∈ C
Γ
s (N),
for all i ∈ P¯Γ (S), d˜S(i) is the out-degree of i in the subgraph Γ |P¯Γ (S), i.e.,
d˜S(i) = |FΓ (i) ∩ P¯Γ (S)|,
in particular, d˜N (i) = d˜Γ (i) for all i ∈ N .
If the consideration is restricted to only strongly cycle-free digraph games, then
for any s-connected coalition S ∈ CΓs (N) it holds that∑
i∈S
si(v,Γ )=
∑
i∈LΓ (S)
v(P¯Γ (i))−
∑
i∈S\LΓ (S)
(
d˜S(i)−1
)
v(P¯Γ (i))−
∑
i∈LΓ (P¯Γ (S)\S)
d˜S(i)v(P¯Γ (i)).
For any cycle-free digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN the overall efficiency is given by∑
i∈N
si(v,Γ ) =
∑
i∈LΓ (N)
v(P¯Γ (i))−
∑
i∈N\LΓ (N)
(
κ˜N (i)−1
)
v(P¯Γ (i)),
while if the consideration is restricted to only strongly cycle-free digraph games, the
last equality reduces to∑
i∈N
si(v,Γ ) =
∑
i∈LΓ (N)
v(P¯Γ (i))−
∑
i∈N\LΓ (N)
(
d˜Γ (i)−1
)
v(P¯Γ (i)).
For a cycle-free digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 ∈ GΓN , the s-core C
s(v,Γ ) is defined as the
set of component efficient payoff vectors that are not dominated by any s-connected
coalition,
Cs(v,Γ ) = {x ∈ IRN | x(C) = v(C),∀C ∈ N/Γ ; x(S) ≥ v(S),∀S ∈ CΓs (N)},
while the weak s-core C˜s(v,Γ ) as the set of weakly component efficient payoff vectors
that are not dominated by any s-connected coalition,
C˜s(v,Γ ) = {x ∈ IRN | x(C) ≤ v(C),∀C ∈ N/Γ ; x(S) ≥ v(S),∀S ∈ CΓs (N)}.
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Theorem 11 The sink value on the subclass of superadditive rooted-forest digraph
games is stable.
A cycle-free digraph game 〈v,Γ 〉 is s-convex, if for all s-connected coalitions
T,Q ⊂ CΓs (N) such that T is a full s-connected set, Q is a full predecessors set, and
T ∪Q ∈ CΓs (N), it holds that
v(T ) + v(Q) ≤ v(T ∪Q) + v(T ∩Q).
Theorem 12 The sink value on the subclass of s-convex strongly cycle-free digraph
games is weakly efficient.
4 Sharing a river with multiple sources, a delta and
possible islands
Ambec and Sprumont [1] approach the problem of optimal water allocation for a
given river with certain capacity over the agents (cities, countries) located along
the river from the game theoretic point of view. Their model assumes that between
each pair of neighboring agents there is an additional inflow of water. Each agent, in
principal, can use all the inflow between itself and its upstream neighbor, however,
this allocation in general is not optimal in respect to total welfare. To obtain a more
profitable allocation it is allowed to allocate more water to downstream agents which
in turn can compensate the extra water obtained by side-payments to upstream ones.
The problem of optimal water allocation is approached as the problem of optimal
welfare distribution. Van den Brink et al. [8] show that the Ambec-Sprumont river
game model can be naturally embedded into the framework of a graph game with
line-graph cooperation structure. In Khmelnitskaya [6] the line-graph river model
is extended to the rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph model of a river with a delta or
with multiple sources, respectively. We extend the line-graph, rooted-tree or sink-
tree model of a river to the cycle-free digraph model of a river with both multiple
sources and a delta, and also possible islands along the river bed as well.
Let N be a set players (users of water) located along the river from upstream
to downstream. Let eki ≥ 0, i ∈ N , k ∈ O(i), be the inflow of water in front of
the most upstream player(s) (in this case k = 0) or the inflow of water entering the
river between neighboring players in front of player i. Figure 8 provides a schematic
representation of the model.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11 12
13
i i+1
i+2
i+3
i+4
i+5
e0,1
e0,2
e0,3
e0,4
e1,5
e0,7
e5,10
e7,8
e10,11
e10,13
e11,12
ei−1,i ei,i+1
ei+1,i+2
ei+2,i+5
Figure 8
A river with multiple sources, a delta, and several islands along the river bed
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Following Ambec and Sprumont [1] it is assumed that each player i ∈ N has a
quasi-linear utility function given by ui(xi, ti) = b
i(xi) + ti where ti is a monetary
compensation to player i, xi is the amount of water allocated to player i, and
bi : IR+ → IR is a continuous nondecreasing function providing benefit b
i(xi) to
player i when he consumes the amount xi of water. Moreover, in case of a river with
a delta it is also assumed that if a splitting of the river into branches happens to
occur after a certain player, then this player takes, besides his own quota, also the
responsibility to split the rest of the water flow to the branches such to guarantee
the realization of the water distribution plan x∗ to his successors.
The superadditive river game v ∈ GN introduced under the same assumptions
in Khmelnitskaya [6] for a river with multiple sources or a delta defined as: for any
connected coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) =
∑
i∈S b
i(xSi ),
where xS ∈ IRs solves
max
x∈IRs+
∑
i∈S
bi(xi) s.t.


∑
j∈P¯Γ (i)
xj ≤
∑
j∈P¯Γ (i)
∑
k∈O(j)
ekj ,
∑
j∈PΓ (i)∪B¯Γ (i)
xj ≤
∑
j∈PΓ (i)∪B¯Γ (i)
∑
k∈O(j)
ekj ,
∀i ∈ S,
and for any disconnected coalition S ⊂ N , v(S) =
∑
T∈CΓ (S)
v(T ), suits to the case of
a river with both multiple sources and a delta, and also possible islands along the
river bed as well. The tree and sink values proposed above can be applied for the
solution of the river game in the general case.
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